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Executive Summary 
 Non-bank financial institutions (“shadow banks”) filled the funding gap following banks’ retreat in the wake of the 
post-crisis regulatory tightening and amid pressure to bolster returns in response to central banks’ low rates policy 
 “Shadow banks” such as investment managers, insurance companies and pension funds reacted to policy-induced 
volatility suppression by moving up the risk ladder: longer term bonds, high yield debt, equities, and direct lending 
 Prolonged volatility dampening induced investors to forgo volatility hedging and fueled the growth of passive 
funds, and rising concentration of “flighty asset” in passive funds increased probability for a “shadow bank run” 
 Non-banks are becoming increasingly reliant on monetary authorities to continue volatility suppression, and many 
“reach for yield” and risk-parity strategies hinge on prolonged policy accommodation to ward against redemption 
 Looming increase in Fed balance sheet reinvestment cap and ECB QE taper will threaten years of non-bank risk 
accumulation made viable by low volatility, and a decline in asset prices will likely trigger a systemic VaR shock 
Non-banks’ growing footprint and risk exposure 
olicy landscape following the financial crisis presented a “path of least resistance” for non-bank financial institutions 
to expand into areas previously dominated by banks. Unrestrained by financial regulations such as Basel III and 
hunger for yield under unconventional monetary stimulus by global monetary authorities, which dampened risk-
free returns and encouraged investors to take bigger risks via the “recruitment channel” (central bank guidance to induce 
investors to take on more interest rate risk and push down term premiums), non-banks were seen extending duration 
(buying longer maturity bonds), taking bigger credit risk (buying investment grade and high yield debt), bolstering equities 
exposure, expanding in the direct lending market, and increasingly take on intermediary roles: 
 As “reach for yield” intensified under effects of QE, many investors extracted liquidity premium (“selling liquidity”) 
by buying less-liquid assets, and well-funded non-bank investment firms have directly finance home purchases to 
turn them in to rentals, with rental payment from pools of houses used as collateral to secure short-term funding 
 As bond yields decline, insurance companies faced a “perverse” feedback loop where lower yields would beget 
further buying to close the “duration gap” because duration of liabilities would rise faster than that of assets; the 
reverse is also true, where rising bond yields would see decline in duration of liabilities outpace portfolio’s bonds 
 Silicon Valley is “bursting with fledging venture-capital funds” thanks to “endless flood of cash” from college 
endowments, nonprofit foundations and pension funds as non-bank financials joined the hunt for tech unicorns 
 In a move that harken back to pre-crisis days, some non-bank asset management firms who invest on behalf of 
pensions funds and other institutional investors are offering high premium “covenant-lite” loans to “selective” 
direct lending customers 
 Market participants began to notice serious slippage in lending standards in the $940 billion leveraged loans 
market as low interest rates combined with strong demand for credit vehicles encouraged riskiest companies to 
lever up. As a whole, riskier “covenant-lite” loans now account for about 70% of new leveraged loans (often sold 
by private equity firms to finance leveraged buyouts); institutional buyers of these loans may not realize what 
they are giving up, as the loans are often pooled together within opaque collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) 
 As banks pared risk in response to regulatory curbs (both tighter capital requirements and heavy penalties from 
non-conformity), agency MBS origination by non-bank financial institutions had accounted for 53% of all such 
originations in early 2015 (almost double from the same period in 2013) 
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As a whole, the non-bank financial sector has pushed its risk envelope in response to monetary authorities’ effort to 
dampen long-maturity bond yields and suppress volatility. The aforementioned “yield seeking” strategies share a common 
vulnerability – a rise in volatility would foremost threaten illiquid (because liquidity is never there when one needs it the 
most) and low credit quality instruments, and given bullish risk-parity (bearish volatility) being the consensus outlook in 
the industry, even a small volatility spike would likely shift perception on portfolio value at risk (hence risk of a VaR shock).  
The rise in volatility would also threaten long-duration sovereign bonds. As seen in the BIS analysis that “low bond yields 
beget more buying” (see chart below), an unexpected rise in long maturity bond yields would also likely to amplify non-
bank institutions’ duration shedding and potentially trigger a VaR shock in the sovereign bond market. 
 
Low volatility gave rise to passive funds and risks of “shadow bank run” 
Encouraged by nearly a decade of low volatility policies (QE programs have buoyed valuation across multiple asset classes 
to dampen volatility), investors are increasingly willing to forgo volatility hedging by pulling asset out of active investment 
managers and increasing allocation in passive index instruments. 
It is thus not surprising that Vanguard and BlackRock now manage in excess of $10 trillion in assets thanks to relentless 
inflow into passive index funds and ETFs. However, the convenience offered by exchange traded funds and the “race-to-
zero” (in fees) masked a hidden risk – the easy inflows can quickly turn into “at will” selling and a cascade of redemption 
waves if volatility return.  
Unlike professional investors who tend to be “strong hands” and willing to ride out adverse market conditions, retail funds 
are generally more “flighty” in nature, especially at a time when a 2% weakness in the broader index would make headline 
news on major publications. A severe risk-parity unwind in both equities and bonds would likely decimate corresponding 
ETFs and shaken investor confidence. This would sow the seeds of a potential stampede out of the door, and prolonged 
redemption waves would risk morphing into a “shadow bank run” if retail investors become downbeat on the conditions 
of their asset managers.  
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Should the passive funds run into difficulties, active managers with similar exposures (such as the not-so-uncommon 
tendency for some active managers to “hug the index”) would likely experience similar mark-to-market pains. Given many 
institutions share similar risk management methodologies as well as risk management professionals who share a common 
intellectual lineage – working at similar sell-side firms prior to coming to the buy side, took similar courses in graduate 
school, using the same risk management software supported by the same vendors, markets’ reaction function on a severe 
volatility spike would likely be surprisingly synchronized to amplify price impact. 
Nevertheless, many investors remain optimistic that volatilities are no different than financial market boogeymen that 
cynical old traders made up to frighten first year analysts. Many continue to count on global monetary authorities to keep 
volatility suppressed with excess liquidity generation. 
Looming quantitative tightening as a catalyst for volatility 
With the Federal Reserve on-track to increase balance sheet reinvestment cap to $20 billion per month (Treasury cap to 
$6 billion from $12 billion, MBS from $4 to $8 billion), ECB to soon begin QE taper, as well as signs of less term premium 
suppression by the BOJ, global excess liquidity generation will likely ease in the months ahead and reduce the effectiveness 
of policy-induced volatility suppression and threaten assets that have been levitated by policy support: long-maturity 
government bonds, risk assets such as equities and credit instruments, as well as less liquid investments favored by private 
equity investments.  
This is similar to the transmission of risk contagion during the last financial crisis, which was spread via toxic assets on 
bank balance sheets – an area where regulators continue to maintain strong focus. However, many investors and officials 
did not realize that similar risks had since migrated to the non-bank sector in the ensuing years (and the unfortunate truth 
that regulatory measures would only channel risks to other parts of the system), and financial excess had ballooned thanks 
to nearly a decade of policy-induced volatility aided by risk-taking on a global scale. The risk transmission mechanisms are 
in place, and the only missing catalyst is volatility: 
 “Flighty money” are amassed at a number of large non-bank institutions with closely correlated risk exposures 
 Consensus bullishness toward risk-parity reflects collective vulnerability to a decline in asset prices 
 Non-bank financial intermediaries tend to contract their balance sheets more than banks in adverse conditions  
 Non-banks’ risk management process remain untested after years of “worry-free” march to steadily add risk 
 Prices of illiquid assets remain buoyant despite liquidity conditions would deteriorate under volatility shock 
 
